

With Us or With the Terrorists

By

Kristina Youngblood

Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Chairperson Juliet Kaarbo

Brent Steele

Mark Joslyn

Date Defended: May 20, 2011

The Thesis Committee for Kristina Youngblood
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

With Us or With the Terrorists

Chairperson Juliet Kaarbo

Date approved: June 12, 2011

Abstract:

The purpose of this thesis is to merge research on public opinion and foreign policy within political science with research from psychology on the impact of images on perceptions. The central question for this thesis asks if a political leader can shape public opinion about a country and its actions based on the image invoked in the leaders discourse. This research argues that public opinion is an important factor in foreign policy decision making, specifically in the decision to use force. Political leaders use speeches to communicate their policies to the public. In turn the speeches affect the publics' perceptions and opinions about the topic of the political leaders speech. The magnitude and direction of the response in public opinion is influenced by the successful invocation of images by the political leader. Not all images are created equal, specific images may resonate stronger with a population; therefore, it is important to explore the differences in image type used by leaders. This research blends affective approaches to image theory with cognitive approaches adding in public opinion. The final section of this thesis details future tests for this new approach to image theory.

Acknowledgments:

I would like to thank Julie Kaarbo for reading many, many, many drafts of my thesis over the years. I would also like to thank Brent Steele for asking the tough questions. I would like to thank Mark Joslyn for helpful suggestions on how to further this project in the future. I want to also thank my mom and dad for their support allowing me to fulfill my dream to go to graduate school even in the face of adversity. And to Logan, the little man, thanks for putting up with a lax bedtime.

Table of Contents

Chapter I: Introduction	1
Chapter II: Public Opinion	4
Public Opinion and Policy	4
Sources of Domestic Public Opinion	6
Media and Domestic Public Opinion	7
The President and Domestic Public Opinion	9
Framing Effects	10
Public Opinion and Partisanship	13
Emotion in Politics	14
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy	15
Sources of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy	19
Media and Foreign Policy	19
Elite Leadership and Foreign Policy	21
Partisanship and Foreign Policy	22
Emotion in Politics and Foreign Policy	23
Does Europe Differ	24
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Europe	28
Public Opinion and Integration Within the European Union	30
European Union, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy	31
Partisanship in the European Union and Foreign Policy	33
Chapter III: Image Theory	35
Image Types	38
Chapter IV: A Theory of Public Opinion and Images	41
Table 1: Image Types and Expectations	46
Table 2: Coding Scheme and Emotions	48
Future Test	49
Future Research	49
Chapter V: Conclusion	52
References	53

Chapter I: Introduction

After an international crisis the public looks to political leaders for information. In times of crisis when information is low, the political leader of a country can use speeches to shape public opinion about an event and the actors involved. A political leader can frame the situation in specific ways to mobilize popular support for a prescribed action. When leaders connect these frames with emotional responses, public support is expected to increase. Emotional responses of speeches can be studied by looking at the images that leaders invoke during a speech. Images, such as the diabolical enemy image and the ally image are expected to interact with emotional responses of the public that increase support or approval of the political leaders' agenda.

The purpose of this thesis is to merge research on public opinion and foreign policy within political science with research from psychology on the impact of images on perceptions. The central question for this thesis asks if a political leader can shape public opinion about a country and its actions based on the image invoked in the leaders discourse. This research argues that public opinion is an important factor in foreign policy decision making, specifically in the decision to use force. Political leaders use speeches to communicate their policies to the public. In turn the speeches affect the publics' perceptions and opinions about the topic of the political leaders speech. The magnitude and direction of the response in public opinion is influenced by the successful invocation of images by the political leader. Not all images are created equal, specific images may resonate stronger with a population; therefore, it is important to explore the differences in image type used by leaders.

This research is not limited to the ability of the President of the United States to invoke images in his or her speeches. Conceptually this theory's application extends beyond the United States to include all democracies. For the purpose of this paper, the political leader is defined as

the leader of the government, such as the President in the United States, the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, and the Chancellor in Germany. This does not indicate that the people in these positions are the only leaders able to use images to shape public opinion, but research into the ability of other elites, such as party and media, is beyond the scope of this discussion.

This thesis focuses on democratic governments given the expected relationship between public opinion and democracy. Government for the people by the people is a common definition of democracy (Schattschneider 1975). Democratic ideals dictate that the citizens are involved in the operations of government primarily by electing leaders to make policy. Representatives are expected to respond to the will of the people, when making decisions about government and policy. Foreign policy provides a problem for this simple model of responsiveness. If the public has no knowledge of foreign affairs, how do they form their opinion for leaders to implement? Previous research focuses on political leaders leading the public and the public leading the policy, with a strong preference given to research on the U.S. president (e.g. Cohen 1995; Foyle 2004; Kohut 2009; Ostrom and Job 1986; Page et al. 1987; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). The focus on the U.S. president is logical, American political scientists conduct most of these studies, the U.S. president is the only elected leader in the U.S. who deals directly with foreign policy and he/she is the only U.S. leader elected by the entire country. Integral to this research is the connection between public opinion and foreign policy. A large body of research debates the importance of public opinion to foreign policy decision making (Cohen 1973; Foyle 2004; Holsti 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983; Sobel 2001). This thesis argues that public opinion matters to political leaders when making foreign policy decisions.

This thesis proceeds as follows. In the first section it discusses the evolution of research on public opinion and policy, both domestic and foreign. The purpose of this section is to

establish that public opinion is an important consideration for leaders. The second section details research dedicated to image theory within psychology and political science. The section discusses the past applications of image theory to foreign policy concepts establishing the premise that images can influence beliefs and opinions. The third section of this paper outlines the research design proposed to test the theory developed in this paper, that images used by political leaders can be used to shape public opinion about foreign policy. This section outlines specific details of how each image is conveyed to the public and the expected effects. This section introduces a possible coding scheme that would delineate which image a leader invokes in his speech. Finally, this section discusses future research questions and hypotheses for research on this topic.

Public Opinion

Before addressing how leaders use images in speeches to influence public opinion about policy, it is important to discuss whether public opinion matters for foreign policy decisions. This is a crucial point to address because if public opinion does not constrain leaders, then leaders have no incentive to manipulate public opinion in the first place. It is important to discuss the evolution of research on public opinion of both domestic policy and foreign policy because insights can be derived from domestic policy and applied to foreign policy. It is equally important to note that there may be differences in how public opinion influences policy at the domestic and foreign level across different democracies. Research on public opinion and foreign policy should not be limited to the U.S. style of government. Political leaders in parliamentary systems may also use images in their speeches to influence public opinion. For this reason research in this section not only addresses the role of public opinion in the United States, but also includes research conducted in Europe as well.

Public Opinion and Policy

Political scientists have investigated the responsiveness of politicians to public opinion extensively (e.g. Miller and Stokes 1963; Monroe 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983). These studies are important in determining whether elected officials are reactive to public opinion or dismissive, but they do not adequately address public opinion formation. Democratic governments are expected to be influenced by public opinion during the policy making process according to theories of democratic responsiveness (Stimson, et al. 1995). Many studies have been conducted on the nature of public opinion and policy within the United States (Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983). Research at the domestic level predominantly focuses on democratic responsiveness, they do not measure how responsive a government is to public

opinion (Monroe 1998). Studies indicate that a key variable of whether public policy responds to public opinion is the salience of an issue (Zaller 1992). Issues that have higher levels of salience typically have higher levels of correlation between a policy adopted and a constituency preference. “If public opinion is roughly the same in most districts (as is often the case), then it can have little explanatory power for legislative behavior” (Monroe 1998). Salience is an important indicator of whether public opinion will be congruent with policy.

Two main approaches developed to study democratic responsiveness within the literature; the congruence model and the consistency model. The congruence approach uses questions from multiple surveys to measure opinion change and then policy change, if opinion and policy change in the same direction then congruence occurs (Page and Shapiro 1983). The consistency approach “takes surveys done at one point in time and compares the distribution of public opinion with policy outcome” (Monroe 1998, p 9). The approaches suffer from similar shortcomings, they do not prove causality nor can they refute the possibility of spuriousness; however, a lack in consistency indicates that public opinion would have no impact on policy.

Early research in this area produced inconclusive results. Miller and Stokes indicate that representatives and their constituents' policy preferences on issues of social welfare and civil rights have high levels of congruence, while there was no discernible pattern of agreement on foreign affairs (1963). Page and Shapiro find high levels of policy congruence, approximately 70% on domestic issues (1983). Their analysis indicated that changes in policy occurred after changes in public opinion a majority of the time (Page and Shapiro 1983). Monroe finds a drop in congruence from earlier studies in his analysis, but congruence remained (1998). These mixed findings led researchers to conclude “[w]e can be confident only that public opinion, whatever its sources and quality, is a factor that genuinely affects government policies in the United States”

(Page and Shapiro 1983, p 189). Politicians are found to cater to public opinion, whether because they feel it is their duty, because they agree with the policy, or because they desire to be re-elected, does not matter. The evidence shows that public opinion has an influence on domestic policy. These studies are unable to show whether there is a reciprocal effect of political leadership on public opinion. Public opinion's impact on policy is important, and to ignore where the public gets its opinion is a gross oversight in the literature.

Sources of Domestic Public Opinion

While democratic responsiveness is a worthwhile area to explore, it is just as vital to consider where public opinion originates. If, as described by the democratic responsiveness argument, elected officials should create policy that is congruent with their constituents' desires, then the source of opinion has an impact on the policy implemented. This question is important because democratic governments are expected to respond to their constituent's preferences (Dahl 1989). Research has shown that in the U.S. and Europe political leaders respond to public opinion in some circumstances (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Miller and Stokes 1963). The question remains that if there is an influence of public opinion on policy, where did public opinion originate? Contemporary literature focuses on the role that elites, particularly political and media, play in the formation of public opinion. Most studies that focus on political elites focus on the president (Cohen 1995; Kohut 2009; Ostrom and Job 1986). The President's prominence in the media and accountability to the country as a whole indicate that he would have the influence required to shift public opinion.

Research regarding public opinion formation within the United States is often inconclusive and conflicting (Monroe 1998; Ragsdale 1984). Researchers disagree about how much of an influence presidents have on public opinion, some say that the influence is minimal

(Ostrom and Job 1986), while others argue that the president is capable of leading the mass public on specific topics (Cohen and Hamman 2003). The role of the media has been explored no less extensively, with similar results (e.g. Page et al. 1987; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006). Much research has tried to tease out the influences of the media and political leaders on public opinion.

Media and Domestic Public Opinion

The news media is an important source of information. Most people only interact with government via the media and elections (Dalton et al. 1998). Few people attend political rallies or participate in politics themselves. Their only source for information about politics is therefore the news media (Kim et al. 2005). There are many factors that contribute to a politically relevant topic being covered on a nightly news program. The selection criteria that media uses in deciding to broadcast an event, influences the saliency of an item, which is important for the public to form an opinion. The neutrality of the media is often contested, with certain news programs perceived to have more bias than others (Iyengar and Kinder 1989; Watts et al. 1999). Due to the nature of the media its influence on public opinion formation is important to investigate.

News matters for the study of public opinion. Very few people are involved with the day-to-day chore of creating policy. Newspapers, nightly newscasts, and more recently the Internet bring political events to the population at large. Consequently, the news is the main source of information about politics for most people (Kim et al. 2005). By choosing what to broadcast on the nightly news and what to put above the fold in a newspaper, media influences what information the public receives first. Given the near monopoly that today's media outlets have on access to information about politics, it is important to consider the role that they play in shaping political public opinion.

There are two ways that the media can influence voter's opinions about politics, agenda setting and priming. News media can tell people what to think about, which is known as agenda setting (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Priming effects by the media influence what comes to mind when a citizen evaluates their political choices (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Using experimental techniques they investigate the influence that television news has on public opinion and discourse (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). The purpose of their study was “to establish that television news is in fact an educator virtually without peer that shapes the American public's conception of political life in pervasive ways; that television news is news that matters” (Iyengar and Kinder 1989, p 2). Americans depend on the mass media for information giving the media incredible ability to shape public opinion. The power of TV rests not on the persuasion but rather on the ability to set the agenda and prime audiences.

Agenda setting findings indicate that prominence of a story on the nightly news effects evaluations by the public of the most pressing issues of the day (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Television news shapes public priorities, these effects do not immediately disappear either, but are lasting. Stories that appear first in a broadcast have strong effects on public opinion. Agenda setting by television news has the most influence on those with the least involvement in political affairs and political independents; while artisans and activists are influenced little by the media (Iyengar and Kinder 1989).

Priming is defined as “calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which government, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged” (Iyengar and Kinder 1989, p 63). People only pay attention to a small amount of information, they prefer heuristics: intuitive short-cuts and rules of thumb. Experiments reveal that priming effects are different for partisans, affecting the out-party most

(Iyengar and Kinder 1989).

Much attention has been paid to the media's ability to influence and shift public opinion. Research indicates that statements of news commentators have a strong impact on public opinion (Page et al. 1987). The role of news commentators as opinion elites is important to explore given their impact on public opinion. The media also influences what is on the national agenda by making the public aware of certain issues. Cuing by the media is found have effects on voters' perceptions, information, attitudes, and even behavior (J. P. Robinson 1976). Contradicting research on the importance of the media in shaping public opinion also abounds. Research by Weaver, indicates that the media is not likely to teach attitudes or opinions, but can indirectly influence voter opinions and evaluations (1996).

The President and Domestic Public Opinion

The ability of the president to lead and shape American public opinion is a large area of study within public opinion literature. The president is often one of few politicians that most Americans can identify (Cohen 2003). One of the most commonly used tools for presidential leadership is giving a speech. In order for the president to lead policy, his viewpoint must be conveyed to the American people. Segments of the population can be reached by speeches that otherwise would not seek out the information on their own. Research indicates that when the president gives a speech, if he is able to influence opinion about a specific topic when he pays it explicit attention (Cohen and Hamman 2003). This could be due to the follower effect where citizens with low political knowledge often become followers, these are people who support the presidential policy regardless of the benefits or consequences of the policy for them (J. Mueller 1973). This follower effect is due in part to informational short cuts, people who support the president are likely to support his policy regardless of the policy because they support the

president.

Research indicates that public perceptions of the president within the United States are tied to economic, social and international performance of the president (Ostrom and Job 1986). Presidents use their approval ratings as political capital to push for their agenda with Congress when they are making policy. In order to garner support for a policy the president often turns to the public, making speeches intended to influence public opinion. Presidential influence is greatest for speeches on foreign policy, and even greater when the president has high approval ratings already (Cohen and Hamman 2003). This influence is attributed to the president's role as leader. Leaders are often perceived as acting in the self interest of the population due to their skills and knowledge of the complexity in the international system when pursuing foreign affairs (Russett 1990). Despite the freedom granted to the president they will often consider the implications from the public for actions taken in the foreign realm (Russett 1990). Evidence supports that the president is capable of leading the public on matters of foreign and domestic policy.

Framing Effects

Political elites are given the ability to frame events in their speeches in order to garner support for their cause. Frames are defined as the way “a source ... defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue” (T. E. Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). Frames can convince the public to support the leader’s policy prescriptions. Leaders use frames to affect public opinion about specific topics during their speeches by paying explicit attention to a topic (Cohen and Hamman 2003; Druckman 2008). There are many types of frames and framing effects.

Within psychology, research on framing effects focuses on the cognitive processes.

Research within cognitive psychology indicates humans are cognitive misers. It is possible for humans to reach their cognitive limits when faced with conflicting information, many alternatives, and important decisions (David P. Redlawsk 2004). In order to make sense of the information that they receive humans place information into cognitive clusters, or schema. A schema gives a structure for understanding new information (Conover and Feldman 1984). These schemas serve as cognitive shortcuts for individuals who are able to categorize new information without the hindrance of creating a new schema for every interaction (Lodge and Hamill 1986). Schemas are expected to influence how an individual perceives new information and selects it for recall (R. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi 1997). Belief systems are related to schemas in the sense that belief systems are organized knowledge of the world that influences perceptions (O. Holsti 1967). Schemas and belief systems provide a framework that an individual uses to interpret the world. Once formed, schemas are resistant to change, often people make new information fit their existing schema rather than the schema fit the information (Fiske and Taylor 1984). Lack of change in schemas is important in order for schemas to provide cognitive short cuts to individuals.

Schemas serve to simplify reality and shape people's perceptions about the world with regard to the schema that is activated (Fiske and Taylor 1984). When new information activates a schema people fill in the gaps about the situation with their knowledge based on the activated schema (Hermann 1986). The process of filling in the gaps enables people to respond to the new information by relying on stereotypes. Stereotypes are associated with similar patterns of ideal-type gestalts (Hermann 2003). Simplicity is again achieved through the use of stereotypes. Stereotypes provide a script for individuals to use when confronted with a situation that fits within a specific schematic cluster (Hermann 2003). Framing effects occur when schema is

activated. Frames are expected to “shape individual understanding and opinion concerning an issues by stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy, reducing a usually complex issue down to one or two central aspects” (T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997, p 568). By emphasizing specific aspects of a topic, the media plays an important role in shaping how people view topics.

Framing is extensively studied as a tool of the mass media (J. N. Druckman 2008; Gross and Brewer 2007; e.g. T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Parker-Stephen and Smidt 2009; Reese and Lewis 2009). Framing effects literature focuses on topics such as civil liberties, foreign policy, government spending (Jacoby 2000; Mintz and Redd 2003; e.g. T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). A framing effect is defined in several ways. Scholars define framing effects as an effect that occurs “when, in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (Druckman 2008, p. 1042). Another definition of frames “is the process by which a communication sources, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy” (T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997, p. 567). In essence frames provide organizing principles around which people can form their opinions. These organizing points allow the public to weigh options and decide on a position, often a difficult task for the public (Zaller and Feldman 1992). The media condenses complex information down to smaller segments of information that allow the public to process information in a coherent fashion.

There is a debate within the literature about the different effects of priming and framing (Chong and Druckman 2007; Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Framing effects are said to occur when logically equivalent wording leads to different conclusions (Druckman 2004). Priming is

described as “changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” within media studies (Iyengar and Kinder 1989, p. 63). There is ample evidence for the effects of priming within the literature. Priming as identified within the psychological literature is expected to make a specific schema more accessible (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). The debate centers on whether there is a difference between priming and framing effects. Chong and Druckman contend that the effects attributed to priming and framing can be subsumed into the same concept (2007). Others argue that there is a difference between the two concepts which is “the difference between whether we think about an issue and *how* we feel about it” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 14). Frames, according to research in mass communications “refers to modes of presentation that journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Priming according to this line of research influences what is salient in people's minds and what the public takes into account when it forms its judgments (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

Public Opinion and Partisanship

Membership in a political party is a key predictor of vote choice identified in the American literature, but ignored at the level of foreign policy (Bartels 2000). Identification with a political party provides voters with a lens in which to view the political environment. Given the nature of political parties and vote choice, it is logical to conclude that party identification could influence opinion formation. Oddly this aspect of opinion formation has not been studied as extensively in political science research. The few studies that have been conducted find that party identification does influence attitudes (Belknap and Campbell 1951). Partisan identification influences people's perceptions of new material even under conditions requiring neutrality (Lodge and Taber 2005). Experimental research indicates that participants use partisan

identification to categorize policy statements (Lodge and Hamill 1986). For this reason new studies of opinion formation need to include partisanship and party leadership as a source of opinion.

Emotion in Politics

Emotions are an integral part of the political process. They are important aspects of personality that need to be included when studying decision making (Redlawsk et al. 2010). Research that focuses on the role of emotions in politics attempts to answer the question of whether we think before we feel or feel before we think (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2005; Marcus and Mackuen 1993). Responses to events, situations, persons and symbols can all be influenced by emotions (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, and Preston 2010). Studies differentiate between affect and emotion. Affect is used for evaluation which can include moods and emotions, it can be both positive or negative (Cottam et al 2010). Emotions are more defined affective states such as anger, hatred, and love (Cottam et al 2010).

A prominent area of research within the subject of emotions relates to the affect of anxiety, threat and enthusiasm (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005; Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Petersen 2010). In this research threat is a motivating factor that increases attention to politics and enthusiasm also increases political involvement (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). Threat is manifested as anxiety which “is argued to regulate the behavior and opinions in the face of *hazards*, i.e., everything from terrorist attacks to rising unemployment rates and environmental disasters (Petersen 2010). Anxious publics will seek out new information when the environment signals that something is not as it should be, this leads them to rely less on heuristics of the political system and focus on issues during elections (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Petersen 2010). This characterization of anxiety links it to the debate that we feel before we think (Marcus

and Mackuen 1993). Research on the effects of fear in campaign advertisements show similar results, fear effects political choice and increases the desire to gain more information about related stories (Brader 2011).

Enthusiasm is characterized by the words sympathy, hope, and proud when referring to a political candidate is (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). The study of enthusiasm indicates that when people feel enthusiastic about a political candidate they are predisposed to vote for that candidate despite partisanship (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Redlawsk et al. 2010). The feeling of enthusiasm particularly is important because not only can it affect vote choice and partisanship, but it has also has been shown to overcome the latent affects of unease with President Obama's race among white voters in the 2008 presidential election (Redlawsk et al. 2010). This is particularly important for research on image theory which proposes that people will feel good about a policy action that they otherwise would not support without emotional incentive.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Most research on public opinion formation focuses on domestic issues, such as social welfare policies. While domestic politics is important, people often have more concrete views of domestic level issues due to more frequent exposure to the issues. The public has less contact with foreign affairs than with domestic politics, making them arguably more susceptible to influence from elites. The few studies of policy congruence between public opinion and actual foreign policy indicate that a majority of the time there is an astonishing amount of congruence between public opinion and foreign policy, although it is uncertain which occurs first (Monroe 1998; Miller and Stokes 1963). There is little research into whether political leaders are motivated by public opinion within the discipline. This is a byproduct of the Almond-Lippman consensus which concluded that on matters of foreign policy the public was uninterested,

volatile, and inconsistent.

Findings indicating that public opinion is congruent with policy challenge early thoughts about the role of public opinion in foreign affairs. These early studies of the connection between foreign affairs and public opinion focused on the ability of the public to have a consistent attitude regarding foreign affairs. Foreign policy occurs outside the immediate location of most of the public, requiring them to pay attention to news about foreign affairs to be informed. Direct effects of foreign affairs on citizens are hard to identify. Many citizens lose interest when foreign affairs are not highly salient. Researchers tracked the volatility of attitudes on foreign affairs concluding that they were volatile and that knowledge of foreign policy facts was lacking in survey respondents, hampering their ability to form a coherent opinion about foreign policy (Almond 1977; Converse 1964). Without background or general knowledge, respondents' opinions lacked structure indicating that public opinion was not a good source of foreign policy decision making (Converse 1964). Most researchers during, what has been termed by Holsti (1992), the Almond-Lippmann consensus era, believed that there was minimal influence of the public on matters of foreign policy. This lack of emphasis on public opinion and foreign policy was fueled by scholarly focus on realism. Realist theory emphasizes the importance of states' interests, defined as power, on foreign policy. Realism also contends that the state is a unitary actor, thus not allowing for an influence of public opinion (Morgenthau 1954). In this era all politics was expected to stop at the waters edge Fear that an emotional and unstructured public would lead the U.S. in directions dangerous directions if the public led foreign policy decisions were eased by evidence that public opinion did little to influence foreign policy. Policy makers were free to pursue policy without expecting retributions from the public until a foreign policy event became the most important issue (Sobel 2001). Thus, as public opinion did not or could not

influence foreign policy except in rare occurrences, there was no need for further research in the field.

Research within Europe assumed a similar vein with regard to Europeans views on foreign policy at this time. Political leaders and researchers believed that a permissive consensus existed amongst the public about matters relating to the EU (Sinnott 2000). Salience of EU issues was low, and consequently the public paid little attention to the matter (R. Eichenberg 1989). Publics were not expected to hold strong beliefs about EU policy or attitudes about the directions that political leaders should take with regard to the EU.

Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann consensus arrived with the Vietnam War. Opposition to the Vietnam War remained consistent despite research indicating public's lack of structure on matters of foreign affairs. Research challenged that public opinion was as volatile as characterized by Almond. Critiques of Converse's work also appeared during this time period. Caspary disagreed with Almond's conclusion that the public's lack of attention to foreign affairs would produce volatile opinions (1970). By investigating more questions than the single question used in Almond's analysis, he found that public opinion is not volatile, but rather that public opinion operates in a "permissive mood" (Caspary 1970). The permissive mood allows policy makers to conduct policy as if they had a "blank check for foreign policy adventures" (Caspary 1970). This mood although permissive, is not as unstable as previously indicated. Drawing from research about opinion change, public opinion was found to respond in rational ways to the international environment (Shapiro and Page 1988). Public opinion was no longer viewed as volatile and emotional. Research in Europe reflected this shift away from viewing public opinion as unimportant for policy makers.

This research is further corroborated from research within Europe indicating that public

opinion responds to events (R. Eichenberg and R. Dalton 1993). Changes in public opinion can be linked to international events, not to a volatile mood swing of the masses. This change was brought on by three events, the Vietnam War, SALT I agreements, and the decrease in salience of security issues (Eichenberg 1989). Research indicated that public opinion was subject to political events, but that it fluctuated in a predictable manner with changes in the foreign policy environment (R. Dalton and Duval 1986). Higher perceptions of Soviet threat are related with higher levels of support for defense spending and political events (Eichenberg 1989). Even attitudes and evaluations of the EU itself were linked to political events (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). These studies indicated that not only did public opinion matter for foreign policy formation but that it was worthy of consulting and leading.

Research into ideological structures guiding foreign policy attitudes has indicated that the concept of a bi-polar structure may be too simplistic (Holsti 1992). Trying to fit people's opinions into either an isolationist or interventionist perspective will not work if people do not think in such a black and white manner. Citizens use heuristics, information shortcuts, to organize their views of foreign policy matters (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). These heuristics serve to guide citizens on foreign policy matters without the need to be informed (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Heuristics help answer questions about the ability of the public to have a coherent opinion while also lacking information about a topic.

After the challenges to the Almond-Lippmann consensus, research about the role of public opinion in foreign policy flourished. Now that the public was no longer problematic for political elites to follow, researchers looked for evidence that there was a connection between public opinion and foreign policy. Studies indicate that there is congruence between public opinion and foreign affairs. Researchers found that within democratic systems, public opinion

“shapes and constrains national security policy” in a variety of ways (Russett 1990). Studies testing for policy congruence found high levels of congruence between policy and public opinion (e.g. Monroe 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983). Eichenberg found evidence that public opinion influenced the policies of NATO and increases in defense spending (1989). Public opinion is an important consideration for political leaders.

Studies have found high levels of congruence between public opinion and foreign policy, but lack clear evidence about who was leading whom (Page and Shapiro 1983). Monroe finds a drop in congruence from earlier studies in his analysis, but that foreign policy related issues always had above average consistency possibly due to the effect of presidential leadership and the public's role of retroactive approval on these matters (1998).

Sources of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Public opinion matters to policy makers. Policy makers have been shown to respond to public opinion on specific issues (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). If policy makers respond to public opinion is it important to understand where the public gets its opinion (Dahl 1989).

Knowledge of foreign affairs is limited in the public; therefore, political leaders provide information about international events to the public. Studies of policy congruence between political elites and public opinion shows that foreign policy issues have higher levels of congruence (Page and Shapiro 1983). It is important to understand the sources of public opinion.

Media and Foreign Policy

Media influence is noted as an influence on public opinion of foreign affairs (e.g. Reese and Lewis 2009). The media has power to influence public opinion on matters of domestic affairs, does this power carry over to the realm of foreign affairs? For most citizens most of the time, foreign policy is far removed from their daily lives. Foreign policy decisions do not

directly influence their daily lives and they are reliant on other sources for information about foreign affairs (Russett 1990). For this reason the media's presentation of the information is important. Prime time presidential speeches on matters of foreign policy are often followed by a rise in presidential approval ratings (Russett 1990).

There is little research that looks at the role of the media in shaping public opinion on foreign policy in isolation. Most of the research acknowledges that the media and political elites cannot influence the public in isolation, these two groups are interconnected (Baum and Potter 2008). The media is mostly treated as an intervening variable between elite leadership and public opinion (e.g. Jentleson 1992). The media is shown to have effects on views about foreign policy by broadcasting presidential speeches and commentators, but causality has not been effectively shown (Jordan and Page 1992).

The CNN effect is considered the media's ability to co-opt the governments ability to create foreign policy (Livingston and Eachus 1995). The media is able to do this through intense focus on specific issues of foreign affairs (Western 2002). This research often looks at the CNN effect in the decision to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. The focus by the media on humanitarian crises shapes public opinion about a the need for intervention, which in turn puts pressures on policy makers (Soderlund 2008). The amount of attention that journalists pay to humanitarian crises will determine whether the state intervenes. The CNN effect while pervasive has been proven to be indeterminate (Mermin 1997; P. Robinson 1999; Soderlund 2008). One of the crucial critiques of the CNN effect is that it does not address questions regarding who controls the media (Robinson 1999). Government leadership of the media may actually be the driving factor (Western 2002).

Elite Leadership and Foreign Policy

The ability of the leader to influence public opinion is another area that is studied (e.g. Foyle 2004). Research conducted in the U.S. predominantly focuses on the role of the president in shaping public opinion. Despite the freedoms granted to the president in the role of formulating foreign policy, evidence suggests that the president does consider public opinion when creating policy (Russett 1990). With regard to the Iraq War in 2003, President Bush indicated that public approval was necessary before operations could commence, although he did contend that public opinion should not be the only consideration in policy making (Foyle 2004). Awareness of public opinion and attempts to shape it by President Bush highlight the importance of public opinion for successful foreign policy endeavors.

In the context of American foreign policy, there are examples of presidential framing of topics with mixed success (e.g. Mintz and Redd 2003). By framing topics in a specific light, political leaders can invoke images with strong emotional connections for the public. One of the areas that the president is given leeway to shape public opinion is during an international crises culminating in a rally round the flag effect (Baum and Potter 2007).

The rally 'round-the-flag literature begins with Mueller's work, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (1973). Mueller defines a rally effect as “being associated with an event which (1) is international and (2) involves the United States and particularly the president directly; and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” (Mueller 1973). Rally events must be international because it must be associated with an event that creates unity within the nation rather than division. Increases in presidential approval are the indicators of a rally event; therefore, the event must directly relate to the U.S. and the president to be relevant to the populace. The public may not notice slight, gradual change in the international environment, but

a dramatic event ensures that the attention of the public is captured and focused on the event long enough for the public to form an opinion.

Followers are members of the public that follow presidential leadership; whereas partisans follow party leadership. Due to levels of uncertainty there are large segments of the population that support the president's policy regardless, they are called followers (Mueller 1973). The U.S. president has the sole responsibility of Head of State which strengthens his follower effect. Among followers, the president leads public opinion about policies due to his role of leader of the country. Where the role is less clear there may be less of an ability for presidential leadership. International crisis events provide a clear role for presidential leadership in an area with high levels of uncertainty. This follower effect gives presidents more flexibility to create/shape foreign policy in the short term (Mueller 1973). "When Presidential war policy shifted...swarms of followers have obligingly accepted the Presidents lead" (Mueller 1973). Presidents have the capability to lead large segments of the population to support their policy by virtue of being the president. The follower effect may be more prominent in the area of foreign policy due to the uncertain nature of the environment.

Partisanship and Foreign Policy

Partisanship is an understudied variable in studies of public opinion formation. As characterized above the study of media and presidential influence on public opinion within the American case has been extensively researched. Scholars attribute this lack of attention to a lack of difference between parties on foreign policy issues. Recently this notion has been challenged. There is increasing evidence within the literature that even in America, parties have differing views on foreign policy. Party can serve as a cognitive shortcut for individuals who are uninformed about foreign policy (Rahn 1993). Party provides a schema that allows the public to

recall information that fits into their schema better than information that is inconsistent (Lodge and Hamill 1986). Scholars as early as Mueller have noted that partisanship is an important predictor in the speed of approval decrease for the president after a rally event, but parties continue to be ignored in the literature on public opinion formation (1973).

The literature suggests that American partisans take cues from party elites about foreign affairs (Belknap and Campbell 1951; Mueller 1971). Political elites are not limited to the governing officials or media elites. Elites can also be comprised of members of a persons political party. Party cues can effect support for foreign policy and evaluations about the truthfulness of information regarding foreign policy (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2009).

Partisan effects have also been noted in support/approval of the president following a rally event (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). After a rally point decreases in the president's popularity are slowest for members of the president's party and quickest for members of the opposition party. Independents decrease presidential support in between the results for the other two parties (Mueller 1973). Partisanship is important because people use party position as a cue to form their preferences when parties offer different view points. Partisanship effects tend to increase with the duration of the conflict (Mueller 1973). "Much of the public's response to the wars [Korea and Vietnam] has been influenced by the position taken by the leadership of the political parties" (Mueller 1973). Party cues are therefore important to the study of shaping foreign policy public opinion even during a crisis situation.

Emotion in Politics and Foreign Policy

Emotions are under explored area of foreign policy opinion formation. Few studies incorporate emotions into their analysis of the opinion policy nexus. Often studies that include emotion, do not directly address the public opinion formation process (Geva and Skorick 1999;

Mintz and Redd 2003). Emotions are an integral part of the decision making process (as quoted earlier). Crisis events are often emotionally charged. To better understand public opinion formation of foreign policy the role of emotions must be considered.

One area of research that acknowledges the role of emotions, is the literature on the rally-'round-the-flag effect and the literature on the body bag effect (e.g. Baker and Oneal 2001; Gartner 2008). The rally effect is commonly defined as “the sudden and substantial increase in public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic international events” (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). The rally 'round the flag effect is the short-lived emotional response in public opinion towards the president after a foreign policy action (Russett 1990). The action is not restricted to the use of force as commonly perceived, but can be any foreign policy action taken by the president (Russett 1990). As with most aspects of foreign policy, the rally effect has predominantly been studied in the U.S. Recently, scholars have looked at countries other than the U.S. to see if there is evidence that the phenomenon occurs in countries other than the U.S. (Lai and Reiter 2005). This study addresses this question, does the rally effect occur outside the U.S. and can it be used to shape public opinion. Presidential approval rating increases from a rally event are short term effects, expected to fade when the event becomes less salient. Presidential popularity declines over time as a general rule, rally points provide “short term bumps and wiggles” in this pattern (Mueller 1973).

Does Europe Differ

The leadership role of the president on foreign policy matters within the U.S. is generally accepted. The president is both the head of state and the head of government. His official role as commander in chief of the military has been used by presidents to establish his supremacy in foreign affairs. Presidents are responsible for communicating their policies to both the public and

politicians. By *going public*, presidents attempt to use their position of leader to persuade both the public and politicians to back their policies. Presidents can hold televised press conferences followed by questions to communicate their policies and views. The president is required to give a State of the Union address to Congress once a year, where he can propose new policy areas for Congress to consider. During times of uncertainty the president often uses the media as a tool to show that he is aware of the problem and that he is working towards a solution. Often the president is followed by media commentators who not only dissect what the president said and how, but offer counter points to the president's speech. Throughout this process his methods may be questioned but not his authority of leader of the American government.

Parliamentary systems differ dramatically from presidential systems. In parliamentary systems the head of government is the Prime Minister who is selected from the members of parliament, typically he or she is the leader of the majority party. The prime minister is a member of parliament and the authority to govern resides in support from the parliament. Party loyalty, within the legislature, is strong in parliamentary systems, due to their importance in the formation of government. The party is also vital in the election of members to parliament. Party support means financial assistance, endorsement by the party and use of the party brand. In closed list electoral systems voters do not vote for a candidate, rather they vote for a party to represent them in the legislature. Loyalty to the party and the party's political platform is rewarded under parliamentary systems, whereas being a maverick and opposing the party are punished. Bipartisan support for legislation is difficult to get in parliamentary systems.

Parliamentary systems can have minority governments, coalition governments or majority governments. In majority governments, one party receives a majority of seats in parliament, allowing it to form a government without the support of other parties. This type of government is

the predominant form in the United Kingdom. Majority governments do not need to include members of other parties in the assignment of ministry positions. The power within a majority government to enact legislation and determine policy is the most similar to the U.S. presidential system.

Coalition governments are drastically different from the type of government found in the U.S. Coalition governments are the result of no party in the legislature receiving a majority of the vote. Proportional electoral systems, where parties are awarded seats in the legislature based on the percentage of the vote received in each district, often result in coalition governments. When no party receives a majority of seats, the parties in the legislature must negotiate to form a government between two or more parties. The government can be formed along ideological boundaries or policy initiatives. The larger party in the resulting coalition typically receives the premiership, the other ministries are allocated amongst the coalition members as agreed to during the bargaining process. Coalition governments allow smaller parties to play a larger role in creating legislation than would occur in majority governments. Stability of the government resides with the stability of the coalition partners and their ability to work together. In coalition governments there is a larger number of veto players involved in creating policy. The ability of the prime minister to lead the country can be questioned because he or she does not represent a majority of the country directly.

Europe also has two other types of governments that should be considered for public opinion formation. Several governments maintain a hereditary head of state. In constitutional monarchies there is loyalty to the monarchy that transcends party politics. The official role of the monarch varies across countries as does the leadership ability of the monarch. Monarchs may not be involved in the day to day affairs of government, but when and if they express their views it is

libel to resonate with the public.

Semi-presidential systems are another important government type to consider. The power to lead policy and the public is split between a prime minister and president in these systems. After the fall of the Soviet Union many former Communist countries adopted semi-presidential systems. The role of the leaders and their authority varies across countries. In France the president is the stronger of the two. The French president is popularly elected by a majority of the population and then appoints the prime minister and other ministry officials. The French president must appoint the ministry along the political make up of the parliament; however, he can force the prime minister to resign. Under the French system the president is the head of state and the prime minister is head of the government. This clear distinction mandates foreign policy to the president and domestic policy to the prime minister under conditions of cohabitation, when the president and prime minister belong to different parties.

In Poland, another European semi-presidential system, the president is popularly elected, serves as the head of state and has little power over legislation. The prime minister is selected to run the government from the legislature similar to the procedure in parliamentary systems. Leadership of public opinion in Poland is not automatically dominated by either the president or the prime minister. Public opinion leadership in semi-presidential systems inherently differs from the other forms of government given the dual executive.

The European Union (EU) originally established as an economic union to balance U.S. power has grown in influence and policy areas over the years. Policy areas now covered by the EU include economic, social, domestic and to a degree foreign. The EU is organized around the concept of three pillars, the community, the common foreign and security policy, and cooperation in police and judicial matters (Europa - The EU at a Glance 2009). These three pillars are not

equally integrated, but the EU is striving for complete integration as soon as possible. EU policy increasingly influences the policies that governments can pursue unilaterally. The competing philosophies about the structure of the EU, federal system or supranational organization, have not been resolved. Despite the inclusion of a common foreign and security policy as the second pillar within the EU, national governments continue to pursue differing foreign and security policies.

Given the differing governmental systems and actors it is important to ensure that theories developed in America can be applied to Europe. Within Europe there are many different types of governments which give the leader of the country different levels of prominence. In countries with a dual executive the persuasive abilities of the leader will likely vary considerably when the leaders belong to opposing groups. The ability to invoke the ally or enemy image may be considerably less for the opposition party leader as opposed to the Prime Minister. The importance of parties differs in Europe than in the U.S. Party is an important consideration when predicting the leadership ability of political elites within Europe. The role of the EU cannot be ignored when considering public opinion formation on foreign and security policy in the event of a crisis situation. The EU continues to strengthen its influence in this area restricting the possible policy outcomes each member-state can pursue independent of the EU. For this reason it is important to study how and if these structures affect public opinion formation differently than in the U.S. before explaining public opinion with American theories.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Europe

Public opinion studies of European countries tend to focus on how people form their opinions about European integration. European integration is a highly important issues within the EU and prospective member-states. Despite the attention given to the topic of European

integration in the literature there are still a relatively small number of studies before the fall of the Soviet Union. With regards to unification and integration of the EU, policy makers believed that there was a permissive consensus within the populace. The masses had no clear opinion on matters of EU integration because it operated outside of their direct knowledge. This notion was directly challenged multiple times in the 1990s beginning with the Danish rejection of the Maastricht treaty (Worre 1995). Researchers indicated that salience was a crucial predictor of the impact of public opinion on policy (Oppermann and Viehrig 2009).

The EU constitution was designed to further the process of integration amongst member states. When the constitution was rejected by the French and Dutch there was speculation that further EU integration would cease (Sbragia 2006). The constitution was designed to deepen the ties between the member states, but was surprisingly rejected by two of the six founding member states (Sbragia 2006). This is further evidence that the permissive consensus theory of public opinion is false. The failure of the constitution to pass referendum in key member states accents the need for an understanding of the role of public opinion in the EU integration process.

Elites in Europe had formally operated with the same understanding of American elites that public opinion was erratic and not worthy of consultation before policy implementation. Research indicated that public opinion was subject to political events, but that it fluctuated in a predictable manner with changes in the foreign policy environment (Dalton and Duval 1986). Threat perception was linked with support for increased defense spending (Eichenberg 1989). Even attitudes and evaluations of the EU itself were linked to political events (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). These studies indicated that not only did public opinion matter for foreign policy formation but that it was worthy of consulting and leading.

One of the earliest studies of the implications of public opinion on foreign policy among

EU countries, is Eichenberg's book which focused on the role of public opinion in shaping national security policies (1989). During the 1980s, public opinion within European countries became a highly salient issue (Eichenberg 1989). Most early studies of public opinion's interaction with security policy reflected that public opinion followed the opinion of political elites. During the 1980s scholars noted that a change in the importance of public opinion had taken place. Eichenberg found evidence that public opinion influenced the policies of NATO and increases in defense spending (1989).

Public Opinion and Integration Within the European Union

Early research into public opinion and attitudes about EU integration focused on the economic incentives literature. This research posited that citizens' evaluation of the EU was based on their relative economic gains and losses at the hands of the EU. According to this explanation citizens in countries that received financial assistance from the EU would have better evaluations of EU membership “as a good thing”, over citizens who felt that their country was paying more than receiving (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Using early Eurobarometer surveys these researchers found evidence to support the economic calculus model for assessing EU membership.

One of the first instances challenging the permissive consensus involved the Dutch vote on the Maastricht treaty. Within Denmark the negotiations and ratifications of the Maastricht Treaty became a highly salient issues amongst the Danish public. Danes viewed the Maastricht treaty as a question of what model should the EU become, federal or intergovernmental, with Danes heavily favoring the national right to veto (Worre 1995). The original referendum on the Maastricht Treaty did not pass in Denmark because many Danes feared that it would lead toward a federal EU and loss of Danish sovereignty on key issues such as “welfare and taxes, and

defense and foreign affairs” (Worre 1995).

National identity theories were offered to counter explanations given by the economic calculus theory of opinion towards EU integration. This line of research investigated the effect of national identities on support for EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). According to this research identity is an important concept when evaluating policy, ideas that conflict with a person's identity will be viewed in a more negative light than policy that has no effect on their identity or strengthens their identity. Person's who viewed themselves as Europeans first, were expected to have positive feelings about further EU integration (McLaren 2004). Attachment to a national identity first was expected to have the opposite effect, antagonism towards further EU integration. In times of crisis, higher levels of threat perception, increase xenophobic attitudes and animosity (Huddy et al. 2005). Preference for a national identity over a European identity is not automatic (Hooghe and Marks 2007).

European Union, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Foreign and security policy has become a highly salient issue within the EU. Security is traditionally the role of the national government, but integration within the EU has challenged this concept. Terrorism has brought the issue of security to the EU policy agenda. This section will discuss how member states are reacting to security threats in light of EU integration. This section will explore the predicted relationship between EU integration and security policy.

There are two competing models of the EU both within scholarly literature and the political arena. According to the intergovernmental organization model, the EU should be no more “than co-operation between sovereign states” (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997). The federal model emphasizes that the EU should become a supranational government which “is directly responsible to the people of Europe and not national governments” (Thomassen and Schmitt

1997). These two models conflict over where security issues should lie within Europe. The federal model is described as the United States of Europe with European states becoming subordinate to the EU similar to states within the United States of America (Cross 2007). According to the intergovernmental organization model, security is an extension of sovereignty, which is an exclusive right of each member state and its participation within the EU is contingent upon the states agreement with EU policy.

In practice, neither of these models exists, but the ideas persist and effect policy formation and the attention that leaders pay towards public opinion. EU integration continues to challenge ideas of national sovereignty for countries as the EU attempts to deepen the ties of the member states. EU policy was originally formed in what has been termed a “permissive consensus” because of its elite driven nature. Foreign policy issues are often classified this way because the public has little knowledge of these issues except through elites. This theory has been challenged, and overturned in recent years.

Security integration has posed a difficult challenge for the EU. The issue of security has become a top priority of the EU after September 11, but sovereignty issues keep security policy from integrating at levels similar among domestic policies (Cross 2007). Attention to the issue of terrorism and security policy exemplifies the role of sovereignty in the formation of policy at the EU level and public approval of EU integration. To have a common security policy with respect to terrorism requires member states of the EU to cooperate and share information, which is antithetical to the nature of states (Duke 2002). Member states do not wish to become subordinate to the EU as a federal entity.

Due to the nature of terrorism, the EU was given an incentive to further integrate security policies (Cross 2007). An area where this effect is studied in the literature is security technology

integration, which includes security against cyber attack and surveillance and monitoring for weapons of mass destruction (Cross 2007). Security technology is further integrated than many other aspects of security policy because there is a smaller threat to sovereignty in the type of technology used, than in EU mandates requiring states to adopt specific laws (Cross 2007).

Questions regarding the right to have the final say on foreign policy and national security issues among EU member states differ based on the model of the EU that is invoked. Two of the arguments put forward that stress the EU's role in security policy are that security threats to EU countries predominately originate outside of the EU and that the presence of the EU, prevents war from breaking out within the community; therefore, they should have a large say in the security policy of the region (Cottey 2006). The Common Security & Foreign Policy (CFSP) implemented by the EU essentially has an important role in the security policy of the region; however, realization of the goals of the CFSP are rare and often susceptible to relapse (Cottey 2006). An example of the failure for the CFSP to be fully implemented are the events at the focus of this study, the response to September 11, 2001 (Duke 2002). After the events of September 11, 2001 most European states responded at the national level, despite the existence of the CFSP. Responses to terrorism continue to be implemented predominately at the national level rather than the regional or EU level. Nation-states desire to retain control over their security policies is a primary reason for the failure of the CFSP (Cottey 2006).

Partisanship in the European Union and Foreign Policy

Unlike the literature on public opinion formation focused on the U.S., literature focused on the EU acknowledges the role that partisanship plays in providing cues to the public. Within European public's security policy is often polarized along party lines, often left/right; therefore, it is possible that defense policies are replicated along the left/right dimension (Eichenberg 1989).

European parties “show a strong pattern of partisan alignment on defense spending” (Eichenberg 1989). Party elites act as “cue givers” to the party faithful when there are defense issues needing attention. To jump from the notion that parties cue their members about preferences on defense spending to parties cuing members on other matters of defense is not difficult. “The answer must be sought in a basic hypothesis from the field of comparative politics: given that citizens look for “cues” on complicated issues of public policy, the polarization of views is likely to reflect the choices available in the party system and the incentives to party competition defined by the electoral system (Eichenberg 1989).

Chapter III: Image Theory

Image theory within political psychology can be used to provide a framework for understanding how framing effects work. The lack of a theory of framing effects hinders research into the ability of leaders to invoke successful frames to shape public opinion. Applying image theory with its more detailed categorization of images and expected responses on the public can increase support for previous findings. Images invoked by a leader during a speech serve as the frame that a leader gives the target nation. These images are expected to resonate with the public and influence their perception of the target nation.

Research within cognitive psychology indicates humans are cognitive misers. Humans are incapable of taking in all of the information that they are constantly bombarded with in daily life. In order to make sense of the information that they receive humans place information into cognitive clusters, or schema. Schema function as scripts for individuals, they give a structure for understanding new information. These schemas serve as cognitive shortcuts for individuals who are able to categorize new information without the hindrance of creating a new schema for every interaction. Schemas are expected to influence how an individual perceives new information and selects it for recall (R. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi 1997). Belief systems are related to schemas in the sense that belief systems are organized knowledge of the world that influences perceptions (Holsti 1967). Schemas and belief systems provide a framework that an individual uses to interpret the world. Once formed, schemas are resistant to change, often people make new information fit their existing schema rather than the schema fit the information (Fiske and Taylor 1984). Lack of change in schemas is important in order for schemas to provide cognitive short cuts to individuals.

Schemas serve to simplify reality and shape people's perceptions about the world with regard to

the schema that is activated (Fiske and Taylor 1984). When new information activates a schema people fill in the gaps about the situation with their knowledge based on the activated schema (Hermann 1986). The process of filling in the gaps enables people to respond to the new information by relying on stereotypes. Stereotypes are associated with similar patterns of ideal-type gestalts (Hermann 2003). Simplicity is again achieved through the use of stereotypes. Stereotypes provide a script for individuals to use when confronted with a situation that fits within a specific schematic cluster (Hermann 2003). During times of perceived threat or crisis the degree of stereotyping may be more pronounced (Hermann 1986). It is important to note that crisis events may induce people to be more prone to use cognitive shortcuts, when processing information. This aspect of schema is particularly important for image theory.

Applying notions of schema from cognitive psychology image theory defines specific ideal-types that can be categorized when applied to foreign policy (Herrmann et al. 1997). Image theory is then able to relate decision makers' beliefs to policy actions (O'Reilly 2007). A key component of image theory is that policy actions should be determined by the perception of a country within a specified image. Or rather that, actions must balance with perceptions. This balance is important for the validity of image theory because its premise rests on the assumption that a person will react to a specific image in the stereotypical manner given its insights from cognitive psychology.

Image theorists incorporate information about affect and emotion in the research. Affect and emotion are expected to influence the cognitive process which is the basis for image theory. Emotional responses from an image type used to evaluate a target are expected to "balance with the emotional affective sentiment the subject feels toward the observed target" (Herrmann et al. 1997). Image theory postulates that specific emotional responses are closely tied with certain

image types (Cottam et al. 2010). The emotional response that a person feels from an image should indicate a specific policy outcome (Herrmann et al. 1997). The policy outcome should balance with the emotional response and their perception of image type of the target nation (O'Reilly 2007). Political leaders who wish to manipulate public opinion, could use specific images to elicit emotional responses from the public manipulating the public's perception of the target country or policy.

Previous research about leaders' use of speeches to influence public opinion rarely investigates the relationship between emotional responses to the speech and opinion. Rally 'round the flag research is an exception, basing some of the explanations for surges in approval after a crisis to pride and patriotism (i.e. Baker and Oneal 2001). The role of emotions in public opinion formation should be studied in a more substantive and systematic way to discover how emotion and affect relate to policy choice. Research that focuses on regime type perception would benefit from the incorporation of emotion to fully understand the process that creates attitudes towards regime types. Current research assumes that there is a connection between perceptions of regime types and public approval but does not investigate the process that create the connection (i.e. Geva and Hanson 1999). Image theory provides the crucial connection bringing emotions back into the study of public opinion formation.

Image theory relates the cognitive shortcuts people use in daily life to seven image types often invoked in international relations. Image types are created based on information about a country's capabilities, perceptions of threat, and culture and sophistication (O'Reilly 2007). Cultural aspects are important to image theory because norms are culturally defined and are expected to act as a constraint on policy choice (Herrmann et al. 1997). The seven image types are: Enemy, Barbarian, Imperialist, Colonial, Degenerate, Rogue, and Ally.

Image Types

Of the seven image types the rogue image is the most recent addition (O'Reilly 2007). The rogue image was added to characterize the threats of an out-law regime seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction (O'Reilly 2007). These types of states have values that are inconsistent with the international order, they are aggressive and irrational, have a strong belief in their own superiority, and are governed by a small number of elites (Cottam et al. 2010). Threat from a rogue country is expected to be moderate to low given its extreme inferiority.

The enemy image is the most well-known image type. Characterized as a an equal in both culture and capabilities the enemy image invokes strong negative affect and emotion coupled with intense perceived threat (Cottam et al. 2010). Most research within image theory focuses on the enemy image. The ally image is the opposite of the enemy image. The ally is perceived to be culturally and capably equal but has good intentions (Cottam et al. 2010). Allies are expected to pursue mutually beneficial goals due to similar values and motivations (Cottam et al. 2010). Emotional responses to the ally image are expected to be positive.

Barbarian images are used to describe countries that are perceived to be capably superior to one's, but culturally inferior. Emotional responses to the barbarian image include disgust, anger and fear (Cottam et al. 2010). Use of the barbarian image is more common historically, although the Israeli perceptions of Arab states are a possible contemporary example (Cottam et al. 2010). Similar to the barbarian image is the degenerate image. The degenerate is characterized by an inability of the leadership to make a decision (Herrmann et al. 1997). Degenerate countries have strong power capabilities but may not be able to use them given their leadership constraints (Herrmann et al. 1997). Degenerate countries often pose high threats because of their unpredictable nature.

The imperial image describes a country that is superior to one's own both culturally and capably its motivations include exploiting its colonies (Cottam et al. 2010). The colony image is the opposite of the imperial image. This image is used to describe countries where there is an opportunity for an imperial country to come in and take over. The colony image is culturally and capably inferior to one's own country often characterized as childlike (Cottam et al. 2010). Emotional responses to the colony image and imperial image both depend on the relationship between the perceiver and the target country.

Different cultures may respond to the various image types in different ways. Given that perceptions are important indicators of which image type a country belongs in, it is important to investigate the role of images in a variety of countries. Not only may the countries that fit within each image change, but different countries may be able to recognize different image types more readily than others. Evidence of this fact comes from experimental designs testing the validity of image constructs; their findings indicated that American students were least able to identify the colony and degenerate image (Herrmann et al. 1997). Students that have more familiarity with these image types may have been better able to categorize their characteristics.

This aspect is also important for research on the use of images to manipulate public opinion. Each country has different norms that may affect a leader's ability to manipulate public opinion in favor of their policy. Cultural norms may also dictate what it is acceptable to for a political leader to say in speech; thereby, constraining their ability to invoke specific images. According to cognitive psychology, familiarity with a category, or in this case image, is indicative of its future applicability (Cottam 1985). If a leader desires to shape public opinion, he must chose an image that will resonate with his or her public. Effective images will be images that do not challenge a person's preexisting perceptions, as beliefs systems are often difficult and

resistant to change (Holsti 1967).

Research indicates that the enemy, ally, and colony image operate as schema during experimental tests post-Cold War (Herrmann et al. 1997). In this way, it is understandable that the most successful frames for U.S. presidents have been frames that correspond with regime type and enemy images (Mintz and Redd 2003). Regimes that are depicted as enemies and non-democratic invoke a stronger response from the public when they break international norms (Geva and Skorick 1999). Consistency in image and action are important for image effects to take root in public opinion (Geva and Skorick 1999). Invoking the name of a non-democratic leader also triggers a stronger response from survey respondents (Borrelli and Lockerbie 2008). These indicate that once an enemy image is invoked against a target country, there is a stronger negative response to the country (Geva and Hanson 1999). Leaders can then invoke specific images when speaking about target countries to influence public opinion. Once the cognitive shortcuts exist in the public, evidence suggests that support for a policy can be influenced by manipulating images within speeches by political leaders.

Chapter IV: A Theory of Public Opinion and Images

A theory of public opinion formation incorporating insights from image theory would benefit both fields of inquiry. Literature on public opinion lacks clear cognitive mechanisms that connect opinion change with leaders' speeches. Image theory can provide this mechanism. Research that investigates the relationship between leaders speeches and public opinion often looks at differences in survey results after a speech or policy congruence with public opinion (e.g. Shapiro and Page 1988; Cohen and Hamman 2003). This research is valuable, but cannot accurately assess if the speech was the source of any opinion change.

Political communication is analyzed in various ways to deduce the implied effects on public opinion. Literature on framing effects is most common. This type of research often evaluates how an event can be framed, or characterized, to achieve the desired response from the public. Prospect theory has benefited from this literature immensely, showing that there are different preferences in the public based on whether information is presented in the frame of gains or losses (e.g. Boettcher and Cobb 2009; Dunegan 1993).

Without a theoretical framework, it is difficult to assess whether frames that scholars detect in speeches are actually present and resonating with the public. Within foreign policy research there is an indication that successful frames create an "us" vs. "them" mentality and portray target nations as non-democratic (Mintz and Redd 2003). Threat and motive are important aspects of research on framing effects (e.g. Borrelli and Lockerbie 2008; Mintz and Redd 2003). Discourse analysis also uses similar themes to create a story from presidential speeches that is used to shape public opinion (Loseke 2009). Discourse analysis benefits from the addition of emotion to the research, but struggles with causally linking opinion shifts.

This is indicative of the need for a more thorough theory to assess the ability of elite

communication to influence public opinion. Image theory can be used to assess a leader's ability to influence public opinion. Image theory is a process-based theory that can connect elite communication with affective responses in the public that shift their opinion. Speeches where a political leader invokes a specific image type should produce expected changes in public opinion. These changes would relate to the image invoked and the emotional responses felt within the public. The tie to emotion is important in showing that the leader was able to influence public opinion. This is an improvement over literature that uses framing effects because there is clear categorization of what each ideal-type image should describe and how it should effect public perceptions.

Details of Image Types

There are seven different image types that are currently discussed in the literature. These ideal image types vary based on the three areas of assessment, capabilities, threat, and culture. As previously mentioned, capabilities are assessed to understand the policy outcomes ascribed to each image type (Herrmann, et al 1997). Capabilities are assessed comparative to the perceiving nation, a country can either have inferior, equal or superior capabilities. Aspects of culture are important to consider because they are a constraining factor on policy choice and can affect emotional responses to the targeted country (Geva and Skorick 1999; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Culture is measured in two ways, dichotomously as either inferior/different and similar or trichotomously as inferior, similar and superior (Schafer 1997). Threat is the third factor that denotes image type. Threat is used to describe whether the targeted nation is a threat to the country, an opportunity to exploit or a chance for mutual gain (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). The combination of these three factors denote the category or image type that the target nation is ascribed.

The seven image types are the ally, enemy, degenerate, rogue, imperialist, colony, and barbarian. The ally image is used to describe a country that is considered equal in capabilities, culture and is not perceived as a threat. The ally is expected to have similar or compatible goals as the perceiving state (Alexander et al. 2005). The ally is perceived to have good intentions with a many decision makers (Cottam et al 2010). Countries that are perceived as allies, are expected to “pursue mutually beneficial economic relations and to cooperate in peaceful joint efforts to protect and improve the global environment” (Herrmann et al 1997, p 411). Strategies that are employed when a country is perceived as an ally are cooperative, allies are perceived to have mutual confidence, a common cause and institutionalized alliances (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Expected emotional responses from invoking the ally image are a positive affect, with trust and confidence in the ally country. A contemporary example would be the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Opposite of the ally image is the often studied enemy image. The enemy image is characterized as a country that has equal capabilities, equal cultural sophistication, but harmful or threatening intentions (Cottam et al 2010). The enemy image is expected to be a high threat against the perceiving country. The decision making body is a small elite (Cottam et al 2010). The enemy is often characterized as evil and opposite of the perceiving country (Herrmann et al 1997). Strategies employed include containment of and protection against the enemy (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Emotional responses to the enemy image are anger, frustration, envy, jealousy, fear, distrust and a grudging respect (Cottam et al 2010). The Soviet Union was often characterized within the framework of the enemy image. This image is particularly resistant to change (Herrmann 1986).

The degenerate image is invoked to describe a country that has superior or equal

capabilities, a weak-willed culture and presents an opportunity (Cottam et al 2010). The degenerate image has harmful intentions with a confused or differentiated decision making unit (Cottam et al 2010). Leaders of degenerate countries are concerned with “preserving what they have than with a vision for the future and have accepted their fall from greatness” (Herrmann et al 1997). Policy options would include deterrence and attempts to build an alliance with the country (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Emotions that are associated with the degenerate image include disgust, contempt, scorn and anger (Cottam et al 2010). An example of a degenerate is Saddam Hussein's perception of the United States prior to the invasion in 2003 (Cottam et al 2010).

Invocation of the barbarian image denotes a country that has superior capabilities, an inferior culture, and poses a high threat to the country. The barbarian image has harmful intentions with a small elite making the decisions (Cottam et al 2010). The goals of the barbarian country are incompatible with the perceiving country (Alexander et al 2005). Policy options against a barbarian country include augmentation of power and search for allies willing to cooperate against the barbarian (Cottam et al 2010). Emotions invoked by the barbarian image include disgust, anger and fear (Cottam et al 2010). Examples include Israeli perceptions of the Arab world (Cottam et al 2010).

The imperialist image is ascribed to a country that has superior capabilities, superior culture, and poses a threat to the perceiving country (Cottam et al 2010). The imperialist country has exploitative intentions with a small number of decision making groups (Cottam et al 2010). The goals of the imperialist country and the perceiving country are incompatible (Alexander et al 2005). Policy options include avoiding interventions, reduction in access to resources for the imperialist country, submission if the country is too powerful or revolt when possible (Herrmann

and Fischerkeller 1995; Cottam et al 2010). Associated emotions include fear of the imperial power, respect from subordinate, jealousy, anger, and shame from the subordinate while a paternalistic emotion is often felt by the imperial power (Cottam et al 2010).

The colonial image is connected to the imperial image. The colonial country has inferior capabilities and culture (Cottam et al 2010). They present a high opportunity for the perceiving country (Cottam et al 2010). They are expected to have benign intentions with a small governing elite (Cottam et al 2010). They are often viewed as “well meaning children who need tutelage” (Herrmann et al 1997). Policy options include exploitation and insurance of the client relationship (Cottam et al 2010; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Emotions activated in the imperialist country include disgust, contempt and pity (Cottam et al 2010). Examples include Guatemala in 1954, and potentially Guam and Puerto Rico.

The newest addition to image theory is the rogue image. The rogue state developed after the Cold War with the new emphasis in foreign policy on terrorism and outlaw regimes (O'Reilly 2007). The rogue state is characterized by an inferior capability, inferior culture, and moderate threat (Cottam et al 2010). The rogue state rejects the norms of the society states and is unpredictable (O'Reilly 2007). The decision making body is small with harmful intentions (Cottam et al 2010). Crushing the rogue state is the preferred policy option when dealing with a rogue state. Emotions attributed to the use of the rogue image include fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. An example of the rogue country is the portrayal of Iraq in 2003 by President Bush (O'Reilly 2007).

Table 1: Image Types and Expectations

Image	Culture	Capabilities	Threat/Opportunity	Actions
Enemy	Equal	Equal	Threat High	Containment
Ally	Equal	Equal	Threat/Opportunity	Negotiate Common Strategy
Degenerate	Inferior	Strong	Opportunity High/Moderate	Challenge Take Risks
Barbarian	Inferior	Superior	Threat High	Search for Allies Augment Power
Imperialist	Superior	Superior	Threat High	Submit/Revolt when Possible
Colonial	Inferior	Inferior	Opportunity High	Control, Direct, Exploit
Rogue	Inferior	Inferior	Threat Moderate/Low	Crush

Coding Schemes

Coding schemes for speeches should be developed that assess what image of a target country a leader invoked in his or her speech. Coding schemes should be based on the three criteria developed by Herrmann et al (1997). Speeches should be assessed for image type in a similar way that operational code assesses leaders' speeches for belief systems (e.g. Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999). Specific detail should be paid to coding perceptions of threat. Perception of threat is indicative of a higher likelihood to support military action and this concept needs to be incorporated into the coding scheme (Huddy et al. 2005).

In order to assess the image type that a leader invokes in a speech a coding scheme is necessary. A coding scheme will enable researchers to assess the image types invoked by political leaders in a replicable manner. Speeches should be coded based on the use of specific words that assess how the leader is attempting to portray the target country to their population. A detailed list of these words for each image type is included in the table. Examples include evil an

indicator of the enemy image and friend as an indicator of the ally image. Words such as anger are included on more than one image types and should count towards all applicable image types. At the developmental stage of a coding scheme word counts should be used to indicate which image a leader invokes. All image types should be assessed to see how the word choices match public opinion. The word counts should be presented as percentages of words that apply towards an image. The image with the largest percentage is the image that the leaders invokes. No threshold for declaring a speech a specific image type should be established to discover if there are minimal effects for image types. It is possible for a speech to be lacking in image types and for a leader to attempt to invoke more than one image type. Due to the nature of political speeches it is also important to assess whether the coding schemes for speeches are appropriate characterizations of each image. The coding schemes should be tested in experimental settings replicating previous work on the enemy image and ally image to indicate if they connect with the appropriate schemas and lead to the appropriate policy implications (e.g. Herrmann et al. 1997; Geva and Hanson 1999).

Table 2: Coding Scheme and Emotions

Image Type	Corresponding Words	Emotions
Enemy	Enemy, Evil, Bad, Dishonest, Untrustworthy, Devil, Powerful, Covert, Authoritarian, Manipulative, Antagonistic, Deceptive, Aggression, Immoral, Threat, Anger, Fear, Animosity, Conflict, Foe, Competition, Detriment, Deceitful, Attitude, Severe, Combative, Delusional, Cancer, Assault	Anger Frustration Envy Jealousy Fear Distrust Grudging Respect
Ally	Friend, Coalition, Willing, Democracy, Democratic, Shared Values, Colleague, Support, Common, Goals, Similar, Special, Relationship, Good, Moral, Confidant, Team, Agreeable, Trustworthy, Powerful, United, Cohesive, Brotherhood, Alliance, Beneficial, Cooperative, Symbiotic, Loyalty	Confidence Trust Positive Affect Happy
Degenerate	Uninformed, Apathetic, Backward, Previous Glory, Apprehension, Unorganized, Failure, Contempt, Decaying, Declining, Aging, Sinking, Settling, Dwindling	Disgust Contempt Scorn Anger Hatred
Barbarian	Threat, Immoral, Inferior, Different, Strong, Mean, Vindictive, Aggressive, Unjustified, Illegitimate, Jealous, Dictator, Nationalist, Cold Hearted, Frightening, Unpredictable, Unruly, Primitive, Uncultured, Ruthless, Animal, Rebel	Disgust Anger Fear
Imperialist	Respect, Fear, Improve, Superior, Anger, Jealous, Exploit, Arrogant, Disregard, Insensitive, Convert, Imperial, Forceful, Opportunistic, Selective, Bully, Wealthy, Manipulate, Supreme, Insatiable, Dominant	Fear of Imperialist Respect from Subordinates Jealousy Anger Shame
Colonial	Weak, Neutral, Friendly, Non-Threatening, Child, Innocent, Blameless, Apathetic, Drain, Undeveloped, Disadvantaged, Ignorant, Inexperienced, Followers, Helpless, Lacking, Protect, Incapable, Dependent, Powerless	Disgust Contempt Pity
Rogue	Rogue, Unpredictable, Unorganized, Destructive, Misguided, Rebel, Terror, Illegitimate, Immoral, Future, Threat, Anger, Fear, Anxiety, Lesson, Renegade, Non-Conforming, Innovative, Defend, Aggressive, Unmerciful, Demeaning, Oppressive, Dominating	Anxiety Fear Uncertainty

Future Test

The test case for this study will use Iran as an example case of an enemy country. Iran was chosen based on current sentiment and portrayal of Iran as an enemy of the United States. Testing Iran as an enemy was chosen because of the longer history of testing the enemy image over the rogue image. The enemy image has been used in several experimental evaluations with success (e.g. Schafer 1997; Herrmann et al 1997). The rogue and barbarian image have both been investigated more recently (e.g. Alexander et al. 2005; O'Reilly 2007). It is also possible that in the post-9/11 world there are only two image types, us and them.

One of the weaknesses of previous tests of image theory is a lack of assessments of emotive responses. In order to avoid this problem a pre-test will be administered prior to exposure to the speeches to determine current emotional status and perceptions of Iran and other countries. After the pre-test a speech will be read by the participant. The speech will either portray Iran as an enemy of the United States or the facts of the current situation between Iran and the United States. The construction of Iran as an enemy will follow the prescribed attributions of enemy image, equal capabilities and culture with high threat. Words that are listed in the coding section as denoted of the enemy image will be used throughout the speech. Both treatments will contain the same policy prescriptions. After reading the information on Iran, participants will be asked to complete a political knowledge survey. Following the political knowledge survey, they will be asked a series of questions about Iran to assess their emotional responses and opinions after reading the speech. Participants will also be asked about their policy preferences.

Further Research

Further research needs to look at specific images to discover how these images can be

used by political leadership to influence public opinion. Previous scholarship does not directly address the concept of linking different image types to support for political actions. Geva and Skorick (1999) provide a basis for looking at the ally and rogue image with evidence showing support for types of policy that differ with the image invoked. Further research needs to evaluate whether support for policies is dependent on the image invoked in political speeches or some underlying factor. It will be important to understand if image type variations produce different responses within the public. The research should address what images leaders use when they are more successful. Research also needs to look at how image theory is expected to perform in democracies outside of the United States.

Given that the political climate in 2011 is very different from the climate during the Cold War when image theory was first developed and tested, it is important to reassess the appropriateness of the seven image types. Research should determine whether the public still responds to image types with the expected emotional responses and policy preferences. Hypotheses should address the individual image types and expectations. Potential hypotheses include: The enemy image will have the strongest emotional response. The rogue image is a definable image type, different than the enemy image. The ally image will increase emotions of trust and friendship towards the target country.

Image theory has rarely been studied outside of the United States, though there is a notable exception, recent assessment of Lebanese perceptions of the United States (Alexander et al. 2005). With the newly developed coding scheme, researchers can determine if specific image types are culturally dependent. Research can determine if Prime Ministers and President have differing abilities to influence public opinion using image types. Source of image type should be explored such as the ability of the media or party to invoke image types. Potential hypotheses to

be explored include: There is no difference between a Prime Minister and a Presidents ability to influence public opinion using image types. President Bush's portrayal of the world as us and the terrorists effectively created two images in within the United States public, ally and image. Western countries perceive the world in terms of ally and enemy only. All countries can be influenced to perceive the different image types.

Chapter V: Conclusion

This thesis set out to establish a theoretical framework merging literature on public opinion and foreign policy with literature on image theory. A research program was designed to test if the political leader of a country is able to influence public opinion through the use of discursive images in speeches. A new coding scheme for political speeches was developed to establish use of image type by the political leader to understand if speeches can shift public opinion in the expected way. To test this new application of image theory a research design was suggested using Iran as a test case. This research design will be carried out in future research. It is important to assess whether the seven image types described in the literature are still relevant today and whether they resonate with countries outside of the United States. This thesis proposes future research to test the applicability of image theory to other countries. Public opinion is an important tool for policy makers; therefore it is important to understand how public opinion can be created and influenced.

References

- Alexander, Michele G, Shana Levin, and P. J Henry. 2005. "Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images." *Political Psychology* 26(1): 27-45.
- Almond, Gabriel. 1977. *The American people and foreign policy*. Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Baker, William D., and John R. Oneal. 2001. "Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect'." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(5): 661-687.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 35-50.
- Baum, Matthew A., and Philip B.K. Potter. 2008. "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1): 39-65.
- Belknap, George, and Angus Campbell. 1951. "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 15(4): 601-623.
- Boettcher, William A., and Michael D. Cobb. 2009. "'Don't Let Them Die in Vain': Casualty Frames and Public Tolerance for Escalating Commitment in Iraq." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(5): 677-697.
- Borrelli, Stephen, and Brad Lockerbie. 2008. "Framing Effects on Public Opinion During Prewar and Major Combat Phases of the U.S. Wars with Iraq." *Social Science Quarterly* 89(2): 502-522.
- Brader, Ted. 2011. "The Political Relevance of Emotions: 'Reassessing' Revisited." *Political Psychology* 32(2): 337-346.
- Caspary, William R. 1970. "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 64(2): 536-547.
- Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1): 103-126.
- Cohen, Bernard. 1973. *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Cohen, Jeffrey. 2003. *The presidency*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1995. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 87-107.

- Cohen, Jeffrey E, and John A Hamman. 2003. "The Polls: Can Presidential Rhetoric Affect the Public's Economic Perceptions?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33(2): 408-422.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1984. "How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 95-126.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature and Origina of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. D. Apterl. New York: Free.
- Cottam, Martha. 1985. "The Impact of Psychological Images on International Bargaining: The Case of Mexican Natural Gas." *Political Psychology* 6(3): 413-440.
- Cottam, Martha, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston. 2010. *Introduction to political psychology*. 2nd ed. Hove: Psychology Press.
- Cottey, Andrew. 2006. *Security in the new Europe*. London: Palgrave.
- Cross, Mai'a Davis. 2007. "An EU Homeland Security? Sovereignty vs. Supranational Order." *European Security* 16(1): 79-97.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dalton, Russel, and Robert Duval. 1986. "The Political Environment and Foreign Policy Opinions: British Attitudes Toward European Integration, 1972-1979." *British Journal of Political Science* 16(1): 113-134.
- Dalton, Russell J., Paul A. Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1998. "Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election." *The American Political Science Review* 92(1): 111-126.
- Druckman, James. 2004. "Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects." *American Political Science Review* 98(04): 671-686.
- Druckman, James N. 2008. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *The Journal of Politics* 63(04).
- Duke, Simon. 2002. "CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7: 153-169.
- Dunegan, Kenneth. 1993. "Framing, Cognitive Modes, and Image Theory: Toward an Understanding of a Glass Half Full." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 78(3): 491-503.
- Eichenberg, Richard. 1989. *Public opinion and national security in Western Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Eichenberg, Richard C, and Russell J Dalton. 2007. "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004." *Acta Politica* 42(2-3): 128-152.

- Eichenberg, Richard, and Russel Dalton. 1993. "Europeans and the European Community: the Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration." *International Organization* 47(4): 507-534.
- Europa - The EU at a Glance*. 2009.
- Fiske, Susan, and Shelley Taylor. 1984. *Social cognition*. Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Foyle, Douglas C. 2004. "Leading the Public to War? The Influence of American Public Opinion on the Bush Administration's Decision to go to War in Iraq." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 16(3): 269-294.
- GARTNER, SCOTT SIGMUND. 2008. "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach." *American Political Science Review* 102(01): 95-106.
- Geva, Nehemia, and Christopher Hanson. 1999. "Cultural Similarity, Foreign Policy Actions, and Regime Type Perception: An Experimental Study of International Cues and Democratic Peace." *Political Psychology* 20(4): 803-827.
- Geva, Nehemia, and J. Mark Skorick. 1999. "Information Inconsistency and the Cognitive Algebra of Foreign Policy Decision Making." *International Interactions* 25(4): 333-362.
- Gross, Kimberly, and Paul R. Brewer. 2007. "Sore Losers: News Frames, Policy Debates, and Emotions." *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12(1): 122 -133.
- Haider-Markel, Don, and Mark Joslyn. 2009. "A Partisan Education? How Education Extends Partisan Division over Facts."
- Hermann, Richard. 2003. "Image Theory and Strategic Interaction in International Relations." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 285-314.
- . 1986. "The Power of Perceptions in Foreign-Policy Decsion Making: Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 30(4): 841-875.
- Herrmann, Richard K., and Michael P. Fischerkeller. 1995. "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive?strategic Research After the Cold War." *International Organization* 49(03): 415-450.
- Herrmann, Richard, James Voss, Tonya Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi. 1997. "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata." *International S* 41: 403-433.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Michael Nelson. 2003. "Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush

- and the War on Terrorism.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 36(01).
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1049096503001665.
- Holsti, Ole. 1967. “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy.” *Journal of International Affairs* 21(1): 16-39.
- . 2002. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Analysis: Where We Were, Are, and Should Strive to Be.” In *Millennial Reflections on International Studies*, eds. M. Brecher and F. Harvey. Michigan: Michigan University Press, p. 514-528.
- Holsti, Ole R. 1992. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Merston Series: Research Programs and Debates.” *International Studies Quarterly* 36: 439-466.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2004. “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 37(03): 415-420.
- . 2007. “The Sources of Euroscepticism: Introduction.” *Acta Politica* 42(2): 119-127.
- Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 593-608.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1989. *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion*. University Of Chicago Press.
- Jacoby, William G. 2000. “Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 750-767.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. 1992. “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force.” *International Studies Quarterly* 36(1): 49-73.
- Jon Hurwitz, and Mark Peffley. 1987. “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model.” *The American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1099-1120.
- Jordan, Donald L, and Benjamin I Page. 1992. “Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 227-241.
- Kim, Sei-Hill, Dietram A Scheufele, and James Shanahan. 2005. “Who Cares About the Issues? Issue Voting and the Role of News Media During the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election.” *Journal of Communication* 55(1): 103-121.
- Kohut, Andrew. 2009. *But What Do the Polls Show? How Public Opinion Surveys Came to Play a Major Role in Policymaking and Politics*. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.
- Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. 2005. “Rally ’Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-2001.” *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2): 255-

- Livingston, Steven, and Todd Eachus. 1995. "Humanitarian crises and U.S. foreign policy: Somalia and the CNN - effect reconsidered." *Political Communication* 12(4): 413.
- Lodge, Milton, and Ruth Hamill. 1986. "A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing." *The American Political Science Review* 80(2): 505-520.
- Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber. 2005. "The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis." *Political Psychology* 26(3): 455-482.
- Loseke, Donileen. 2009. "Examining Emotion as Discourse: Emotion Codes and Presidential Speeches Justifying War." *The Sociological Quarterly* 50: 497-524.
- Marcus, George E., and Michael B. Mackuen. 1993. "Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns." *The American Political Science Review* 87(3): 672-685.
- Marcus, George, W. Russel Neuman, and Michael Mackuen. 2000. *Affective intelligence and political judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McLaren, Lauren. 2004. "Opposition to European Integration and Fear of Loss of National Identity: Debunking a Basic Assumption Regarding Hostility to the Integration Project." *European Journal of Political Research* 43(6): 895-912.
- Mermin, Jonathan. 1997. "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 112(3): 385-403.
- Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* 57(1): 45-56.
- Mintz, Alex, and Steven Redd. 2003. "Framing Effects in International Relations." *Synthese* 135(2): 193-213.
- Monroe, Alan D. 1998. "Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 62(1): 6-28.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. 1954. *Politics Among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace*. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf.
- Mueller, John. 1973. *War, presidents, and public opinion*. New York: Wiley.
- Mueller, John E. 1971. "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam." *The American Political Science Review* 65(2): 358-375.
- Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *The American Political Science Review*

91(3): 567-583.

Nelson, Thomas E., Zoe M. Oxley, and Rosalee A. Clawson. 1997. "Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects." *Political Behavior* 19(3): 221-246.

Oppermann, Kai, and Henrike Viehrig. 2009. "The Public Salience of Foreign and Security Policy in Britain, Germany and France." *West European Politics* 32(5): 925-942.

Ostrom, Charles W, and Brian L Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 80(2): 541-566.

O'Reilly, K. P. 2007. "Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the 'Rogue State' Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elites." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3: 295-315.

Page, Benjamin I, Robert Y Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. "What Moves Public Opinion?" *American Political Science Review* 81(1): 23-43.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 77(1): 175-190.

Parker-Stephen, Evan, and Corwin D. Smidt. 2009. "Raising the Battle Cry: Communication Strategy and the Case of Iraq." *SSRN eLibrary*.
http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451403 (Accessed March 13, 2010).

Petersen, Michael Bang. 2010. "Distinct Emotions, Distinct Domains: Anger, Anxiety and Perceptions of Intentionality." *The Journal of Politics* 72(02): 357-365.

Ragsdale, Lyn. 1984. "The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980." *American Political Science Review* 78(4): 971-984.

Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 472-496.

Redlawsk, D. P., C. J. Tolbert, and W. Franko. 2010. "Voters, Emotions, and Race in 2008: Obama as the First Black President." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(4): 875-889.

Redlawsk, David P. 2004. "What Voters Do: Information Search During Election Campaigns." *Political Psychology* 25(4): 595-610.

Reese, Stephen D, and Seth C Lewis. 2009. "Framing the War on Terror: The internalization of policy in the US press." *Journalism* 10(6): 777-797.

Robinson, John P. 1976. "The Press and the Voter." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 427(Role of the Mass Media in American Politics): 95-103.

Robinson, Piers. 1999. "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" *Review of International Studies* 25(2): 301-309.

- . 1999. "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" *Review of International Studies* 25(2): 301-309.
- Russett, Bruce. 1990. *Controlling the sword: the democratic governance of national security*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Sbragia, Alberta. 2006. "Introduction-The EU and Its 'Constitution': Public Opinion, Political Elites, and Their International Context." *Political Science and Politics* 39: 237-241.
- Schafer, Mark. 1997. "Images and Policy Preferences." *Political Psychology* 18(4): 813-829.
- Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1975. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. 1st ed. Wadsworth Publishing.
- Scheufele, Dietram A, and David Tewksbury. 2007. "Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models." *Journal of Communication* 57(1): 9-20.
- Shapiro, Robert Y., and Benjamin I. Page. 1988. "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32(2): 211-247.
- Shapiro, Robert, and Lawrence Jacobs. 2000. "Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy." In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House*, eds. Brigitte Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 223-245.
- Sinnott, Richard. 2000. "Public Opinion and European Integration: Permissive Consensus or Premature Politicization." In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, eds. Brigitte L Nacos, Robert Y Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 247-264.
- Sobel, Richard. 2001. *The impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam: constraining the colossus*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Soderlund, Walter. 2008. *Humanitarian crises and intervention: reassessing the impact of mass media*. Sterling VA: Kumarian Press.
- Stimson, James A., Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *The American Political Science Review* 89(3): 543-565.
- Thomassen, Jacques, and Hermann Schmitt. 1997. "Policy Representation." *European Journal of Political Research* 32: 165-184.
- De Vreese, Claes H. de, and Hajo G Boomgaarden. 2006. "Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(2): 419-436.
- Walker, Stephen G, Mark Schafer, and Michael D Young. 1999. "Presidential Operational Codes

- and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(5): 610 - 625.
- Watts, Mark D., David Domke, Dhavan V. Shah, and David P. Fan. 1999. “Elite Cues and Media Bias in Presidential Campaigns: Explaining Public Perceptions of a Liberal Press.” *Communication Research* 26(2): 144-175.
- Weaver, David H. 1996. “What Voters Learn from Media.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546(The Media and Politics): 34-47.
- Western, Jon. 2002. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” *International Security* 26(4): 112-142.
- Worre, Torben. 1995. “First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and 1993.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33(2): 235-257.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaller, John R., and Stanley Feldman. 1992. “A Simple Theory of Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences.” *American Political Science Review* 36(3): 1099-1110.